This paper introduces perfect substitutability between private and public consumption in a dynamic, open economy with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. This implies a direct crowding-out e¤ect that, generalising to the two-country case some well-known properties of a closed economy, tends to reduce consumption following both domestic and foreign expansions. A less expected result is that substitutability has a positive e¤ect on the short-run output spillover. We also show that, if we modify the model to allow for home bias in government spending, temporary …scal expansions display a "quasineutrality" property.
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Introduction
For almost three decades, the standard tool for the analysis of international monetary and …scal policy transmission has been the two-country version of the Mundell-Fleming (hereafter MF) model 1 . Although this framework is still widely used for policy evaluations, it presents several shortcomings. In particular, it is based on an ad-hoc approach in which the relationships between macroeconomic variables are not derived from a microfounded analysis of the agents' behavior. The lack of microfoundation also implies that it is impossible to carry out an explicit welfare analysis of the impact of monetary and …scal policies.
Early attempts to develop a more rigorous framework for the analysis of macroeconomic interdependence can be found in the work of Svensson (1987) , Svennson and van Wijnbergen (1989) and Rankin (1990) . More recent research, following the path-breaking contribution of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (hereafter OR, 1995 (hereafter OR, , 1996 , has seen the emergence of a new paradigm, that embodies market imperfections such as monopolistic competition and price-stickiness in an optimizing setup 2 . In this literature, the analysis of the international e¤ects of macroeconomic policies can be based on a rigorously microfounded framework. Further, the representative agent approach allows an explicit evaluation of the welfare e¤ects of such policies. Although the OR framework is a ‡exible tool that can be used to address several issues in open economics macroeconomics, existing contributions tend to focus on the e¤ects of money shocks, neglecting the role played by government spending. Furthermore, even when government spending is introduced in the analysis, it is usually assumed to be pure waste (as in OR 1995 OR , 1996 or to a¤ect private utility only in an additively separable way 3 . This paper aims at …lling in these gaps in the literature, developing a version of the OR model in which government expenditure a¤ects utility in a non-separable fashion. In doing this, we choose to model private and public 1 Mundell (1968) , Fleming (1962) . 2 The supply side of this framework is akin to the one provided in the closed economy literature by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Ball and Romer (1990) . For a comprehensive survey of this new literature, often referred to as The New Open Economy Macroeconomics, see Lane (1999) .
consumption as perfect substitutes. The main purpose of this paper is that of studying the consequences of the introduction of this hypothesis on the short-run and long-run multipliers of domestic and foreign …scal expansions. Our speci…cation of preferences rests on the idea that public expenditure can have a direct crowding-out e¤ect on private consumption. The debate on crowding-out goes back to Keynes (1929) , that referred to it as diversion. In more recent times, the subject has been studied in a IS/LM framework by Bailey (1971) and Buiter (1977) . Silvestre (1993) stressed the importance of carrying-out an analysis of this phenomenon in an imperfect competition framework. This has been done for a static, closed economy with imperfect competition by Heijdra and Ligthart (1997) but, to the best of our knowledge, there is no contribution in the literature that analyses non-separability between public and private consumption in the framework used in this paper.
We show that the introduction of useful government spending tends to reduce consumption following both domestic and foreign permanent expansions. It also has a negative impact on output, with the exception of the short-run e¤ect following a foreign expansion. Contrary to the MF case, in our model a short-run negative output spillover arises. The introduction of non-separability, having a positive di¤erential e¤ect, mitigates the negative spillover. Both the negative spillover and the positive di¤erential e¤ect of non-separability can be explained with the fact that our money demand equations, being derived from microfoundation, are functions of consumption rather than gross income.
Our model nests the closed economy case, providing microfoundation for results previously illustrated in the IS/LM analysis. As our model also nests the OR case of pure waste government expenditure, a second purpose of this paper is that of carrying out a detailed analysis of …scal policy interdependence in that case. This is a quite interesting exercise, given that OR sketch a version of the model that encompasses government spending but they do not analyse the positive and normative implications of …scal policy in any detail.
Finally, we consider a variant of the model with complete home bias in government spending. This modi…cation breaks down the transmission mechanisms at work in the baseline version. As a result, temporary …scal expansions display a form of short-run "quasi-neutrality", i.e. a temporary expansion in one country raises that country's output on a one-to-one basis, leaving all the other (domestic and foreign) variables una¤ected. The latter property is present in similar models (e.g. Svennson 1987 , Rankin 1990 , Corsetti and Pesenti 1997) , but an intuition for its causes has not been provided yet. Our analysis shows that home bias in government spending can be considered as the main determinant of "quasi-neutrality". A simple intuitive explanation is that, if government spending is used to purchase only domestically produced goods, the costs of an expansion for domestic residents are o¤set by the positive stimulation of domestic demand, and the e¤ect on domestic consumption is therefore zero.With no home-bias the spillover effects are mostly driven by the impact that consumption has, through money demand, on the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, the zero e¤ect on domestic consumption that arises when we introduce home bias also explains why there is no e¤ect on foreign variables.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, in Section 3 the multipliers of a domestic and foreign …scal expansion are explicitly derived and discussed. Section 4 discusses some welfare implications, Section 5 introduces home-bias in government spending in the original setup, while Section 6 draws some conclusions.
The Model
The model presented in this section is an extension of OR (1995, 1996) . The exposition aims at introducing the building blocks of the model as well as the main innovations relative to the basic framework.
The Optimization Problem
There is a continuum of in…nitely-lived agents that are both consumers and monopolistic producers. Both the agents and the single di¤erentiated good that each of them produces are indexed by z2 [0; 1]: There are only two countries in the world: Home and Foreign. Home agents are on the interval [0,n], while foreign agents are on the interval (n,1]. We will introduce the equations for the representative domestic agent, bearing in mind that the model is symmetric and so are the equations concerning the foreign representative individual. The representative agent, indexed by j2 [0; 1], maximizes his intertemporal utility function, given by:
where 0<¯< 1 is the discount factor, and all the parameters are positive. Formula (1) indicates that the agent gains utility from a real private consumption index, from (per-capita) government spending and from real money balances. The consumption index C, de…ned as: (2) aggregates over the consumption of the single goods z by agent j, and µ > 1 is the price elasticity of demand faced by each monopolist 4 . If p(z) is the home-currency price of good z, the home money price level is:
The introduction of welfare enhancing government expenditure is the main innovation of this paper. Notice that, as it will be clear from what follows, introducing government spending in a non-separable way changes the …rst order conditions, and therefore both the positive and normative e¤ects, with respect to the pure waste case. If government spending was introduced in a additively separable way, on the contrary, only the normative e¤ects would be a¤ected. Our model nests the OR case of pure waste government expenditure for°= 0. Finally, the agent experiences disutility in having to give up leisure in order to produce more output 5 , as expressed by the term ¡ k 2 y s (j)
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. This is a crucial di¤erence with classical IS/LM models, where an increase in output is assumed to be unambiguously welfare enhancing.
The utility function of the representative foreign individual is completely analogous to that of the home individual, with the di¤erence that foreign agents gain utility from foreign government expenditure. Furthermore, home money is hold only by home agents and foreign money only by foreign agents. The de ‡ator for foreign money balances M ¤ j s is:
where p*(z) is the foreign currency price of good z. 4 Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , C j is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. The lower is µ the larger is the degree of monopolistic distortion in the economy. 5 Remember that each individual j has the monopoly to produce good j. This speci…ca-tion of consumers preferences allows us to eliminate the labor market from the analysis.
An important hypothesis of the model is that there are no impediments to trade, so that the law of one price holds. This means that, denoting with " the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of home currency), the following relationship holds for each good:
where p(z) and p*(z) are the prices of the same good respectively in home and foreign currency. It follows that the home and foreign consumer prices indexes are linked by the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP):
In every period, the representative individual is subject to the budget constraint:
where B is a riskless real bond denominated in the composite consumption good, that gives account of international shifts in wealth, r t is the real interest rate on bonds between t-1 and t, y t (j) is output of good j and p t (j) is its domestic currency price. M j t¡1 denotes nominal money balances held at the beginning period t and ¿ t lump-sum taxes, that are assumed to be payable in the consumption good C t .
In this framework, the home individual demand 6 for good z is:
By symmetry, the foreign individuals demand for z is:
The home government …nances its spending by means of taxes and seigniorage, according to its budget constraint, expressed in per-capita terms by
The demand function (8) maximizes (2) subject to R 1 0 p(z) c(z) dz = X where X denotes the …xed total nominal expenditure on goods.
An analogous constraint holds abroad 7 . The (per-capita) government real consumption index aggregate over government spending for the di¤erent varieties of goods, with the same elasticity of substitution 8 : (10) A starred version holds for the foreign government. The home and foreign government demands for good z take the same form as the private consumption demands:
Therefore the demand functions for the representative (home and foreign) agents output take the form 9 :
where the superscripts w indicates world aggregates 10 . Dropping the index denoting agent j in order to ease exposition, the …rst order conditions 7 As the agents are in…nitely lived, government debt would be redundant. The introduction of overlapping generations in the model, that would break down Ricardian equivalence, is left for future work. 8 This assumption eliminates the so called "elasticity e¤ect of the spending mix" (see Dixon and Rankin 1994 , p. 189 and the references therein cited): changing the share of government demand on total demand has no e¤ects on the (constant) elasticity of total (private plus public) demand. 9 Equations (13) and (14) are derived integrating demand for good z across all agents, and exploiting the fact that the law of one price and the PPP imply that p(z)=P = p ¤ (z)=P ¤ for any good z.
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That is
Notice that all the variables without the w superscript are per-capita. All world variables can be derived aggregating the per-capita variables considered so far over the n home individuals and the 1 ¡ n foreign individuals. Symmetry implies that the operation of integration reduces to taking a population weighted average of per-capita variables .
are the following 11 :
where i t+1 is the nominal interest rate between t and t + 1 de…ned by the Fisher relation:
If we introduce a notion of consumption that includes government spending as well as private consumption, rede…ning C +°G as "full consumption" (as in Heijdra and Ligthart, 1997) the above expressions are quite standard ones. Equation (15) is the Euler equation that characterizes consumption smoothing. Equation (16) resembles a "textbook" Keynesian money demand function, with the di¤erence that money demand is a positive function of full consumption instead of income. This shows that microfoundation can be consistent with the traditionally postulated money demand equations: money demand is in any case a positive function of a variable that represents the scale of transactions and a negative function of the interest rate. The result that money demand is not a function of gross income, however, will turn out to be crucial for the fact that some of our results in Section 3 are opposite to the "standard" MF ones 12 . Finally, equation (17) is the laborleisure trade-o¤, that equates the marginal disutility of giving up leisure to produce an extra unit of output with the utility deriving from consuming the added revenue that the extra unit of output brings.
11
To derive the …rst order conditions, notice that the demand curve (13) implies:
Substituting the latter expression in to the period budget constraint (7), we obtain an expression for C j t , that can be substituted in to (1) . After these manipulations, the optimization problem of the representative individual becomes an unconstrained one. 12 As in Rankin (1990).
The Initial Steady-State
In order to solve the model, it is necessary to consider a log-linear approximation around a symmetric steady-state. This will be done initially for a ‡exible-price steady state, and the hypothesis of price stickiness will be subsequently introduced. The most convenient steady-state to consider is one in which initial foreign asset and government expenditure are zero for both countries, i.e.: 
and an aggregate goods market clearing condition must hold:
In the initial steady state all the exogenous variables are constant, this implies that consumption is constant as well. Indicating with a bar steadystate variables, the Euler equation (15) with constant consumption gives 13 :
here ± > 0 is the rate of time preference. In the steady-state, consumption is equal to steady-state real income minus government expenditure in both countries:
where in (21) B ¤ is expressed in function of B using (18) . 13 In what follows the time subscript will be dropped, as the variables are considered at the steady state.
We will now present the log-linearization of the model around the symmetricsteady state previously de…ned. Each variable will be expressed in logdeviations from the steady state, and log-deviations will be denoted by lower cases 14 , for example:
Lower cases with a bar will denote long-run variables (i.e. log deviations from one steady state to another) . The variables whose initial steady-state value is zero will be normalized by initial world consumption 15 , for example:
Log-Linearization
Assuming symmetry among each country's producers and approximating around a symmetric steady where the law of one price holds for each individual good yields the log-linear version of the price indexes equations (3) and (4):
where the prices indexes and the single-good prices are now expressed as deviations from the initial steady-state and e t = d" t =" 0.
The purchasing power parity equation (6) becomes:
Log-linearization of the world demand functions for representative domestic and foreign products (13) and (14) yields:
We have already used lower cases to indicate the levels of some of the variables (for example for the prices), but as in what follows we will make extensive use of log-linearizations, the slight overlapping in the notation should not be cause of confusion. 15 Notice that, following the hypotheses of symmetry and of zero initial government spending, this is equivalent to normalizing by C ,C ¤ ,y,y
The log-linear version of the world good-market equilibrium condition is:
The labor-leisure trade o¤ equation (17) and its foreign equivalent become 16 :
Log-linearization of the home Euler equation (15) and of its foreign equivalent yields:
where r t+1 is now the deviation of the real interest rate from its steady state value, ± = r.
Log-linearizing the money demand equation (16) and its foreign equivalent we have:
Finally, it is necessary to log-linearize equations (20) and (21) 17 :
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In what follows, remember that initial government expenditure is …xed to zero and this variables is normalized with respect to consumption.
Notice that in the last two equations the time subscript was dropped, because they are valid only for steady-state changes.
In next Section, we will solve the model for the e¤ects of Home and Foreign government expenditure expansions, explicitly deriving the multipliers of …scal policy shocks on short-run and long-run consumption and output, in a sticky price world.
In doing this, we will mainly restrict our attention to permanent …scal policy shocks, in which:
where g and g
¤
indicates short-run (period one) deviations from the steady-state. Due to the way in which we will introduce nominal rigidity, the economy adjusts to a ‡exible-price equilibrium after one period. The barred variable is, therefore, the long-run (period two) deviation from the initial steady state, that corresponds to the new (post-shock) steady state. In what follows g, g ¤ will be referred to as the temporary components and g, g ¤ as the anticipated components of total (permanent) expansions.
Fiscal Policy Interdependence

Sticky prices
The equilibrium conditions derived in the previous section refer to a ‡exible price steady-state. As we are interested in carrying out our analysis of …scal policy interdependence in a sticky-price world, we have to introduce this hypothesis in the model before explicitly deriving the multipliers.
By following OR (1995, 1996) , we assume that the domestic-currency price of domestic goods and the foreign-currency price of foreign goods are set one period in advance. Following a shock, therefore, these prices do not change in the …rst period but adjust to a ‡exible-price level in the second period. This allows us to set p(h) = p ¤ (f ) = 0 in the log-linearized price index equations (22) and (23) . This dynamic can be rationalized referring to the literature on time-dependent behavior in price setting (for example Fischer 1977) 18 . Although this is a very simpli…ed way to introduce price rigidity, it allows us to study the e¤ects of nominal stickiness on a wide set of macroeconomic variables. The hypothesis of sticky prices introduces a typically Keynesian feature in the model: output becomes demand-determined in the short-run. Therefore, the labor-leisure trade-o¤ equations (28) and (29) bind only in the long-run, when prices are free to adjust to their new steady-state value. The discussion of what would happen in a closed economy is of course an important benchmark for our analysis. As our model tends to a closed economy when n ! 1, we will present some interesting results for this case before proceeding with the two-country analysis.
The Closed Economy Benchmark: the BalancedBudget Multiplier Revisited
Using a system that involves the log-linearized versions of the money demand equations (32) and (33), and of the Euler equations (30) and (31), we can derive an expression for world consumption as a function of …scal policy shocks, that illustrates what would happen in an equivalent closed economy. It turns out that the e¤ect of the anticipated component is zero, and the total e¤ect is therefore equal to the temporary one 19 . The solution is (see Appendix):
where, of course, g w = ng + (1 ¡ n)g: Substituting (36) in to the world good-market equilibrium condition (27) we obtain the corresponding expression for world output: 18 Although OR justify the hypothesis of one period …xed-prices referring to the menucosts literature, we believe that the time-dependent price setting literature is more relevant here, because the fact that prices are …xed does not depend on the size of the shock. 19 As we are focusing on …scal policy, in what follows we will always set money shocks to zero: m = m ¤ = m = m ¤ = 0: As the e¤ects of shocks are additive, nothing is lost with this approach.
Interestingly enough, (36) and (37) reproduce, for°= 0; the "textbook" balanced budget-multiplier 20 : a tax-…nanced increase in government expenditure adds itself, and nothing more, to national income, with no e¤ect on consumption. This result is a step further in reconciling microfounded models with the Keynesian IS/LM analysis of …scal policy in a closed economy.
When agents attach a positive value to government expenditure in their utility (°> 0) the consumption and output multipliers are reduced by an amount that is increasing in°. This is a generalization of the complete crowding-out case studied, among others, by Bailey (1971) and Buiter (1977) . Their analysis is not based on microfounded models, but it is consistent with our when°= 1 21 . In this case the increase in government expenditure crowds-out private consumption to the last penny, with no e¤ect on output. In our model we can have less than complete crowding-out because our preferences speci…cation in (1) allows us to consider the case in which the marginal rate of substitution between private and public consumption is less than unity. As°gives the inclination of the indi¤erence curves between private and public consumption, a reduction of this parameter from 1 to a value less than 1 implies that the reduction in C that is needed to keep utility on the same indi¤erence curve, following an expansion in G, becomes smaller. This can be easily checked graphically (Fig. 1) , and provides an explanation for the possibility of less than complete crowding-out in our model 22 . This last case is probably the empirically relevant one, and in our discussion of multipliers we will therefore assume 0 <°< 1 (as in Barro, 1981; Aschauer, 1985 ; Heijdra and Litgthart, 1997). For example Buiter (1977, p. 317 ) de…nes the consumption function as C = C P + G P , where C P and G P are, respectively, private and public consumption, implicitely assuming°= 1.
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Notice that varying°does not change the degree of substitutability between C and G: As the indi¤erence curves are straight lines for every positive value of°, private and public consumption are perfect substitutes for any positive°. Varying°only modi…es the marginal rate of substitution between them.
Two Relationships between Relative Consumption and the Exchange Rate
We can now proceed with the analysis of the open economy case. Following Aoki (1981) , a symmetric two country model can be "decoupled" into independent systems in sums and di¤erences. It is convenient, therefore, to solve the model initially for country di¤erences, and subsequently derive the levels of the variables using the relationship:
where x indicates a generic variable. The …rst step to solve the model is to de…ne two relationships between the short-run levels of the exchange rate and of relative consumption. The …rst relationship can be derived using the Euler equations (30) and (31), the money demand equations (32) and (33), and the PPP (24):
This expression nests the one derived by OR in the pure waste case 23 . The di¤erence is that in our model domestic and foreign …scal expansions a¤ect the exchange rate (through the e¤ect on money demand).
To derive a second relationship, we must consider two equations that give the level of the current account in the two countries in the short-run (when the shock hits the economy):
Log-linearization of equation (40), taking into account that initial foreign assets are zero, and using equation (22) with p(h) and p ¤ (f ) set to zero yields 24 :
In a similar way, for the Foreign country we obtain: 23 To derive (39) it is also necessary to take in to account the fact that, since in ‡ation and the real interest rate are constant across steady states, the money demand equations (32) and (33) imply the following solutions for steady-state price levels:p = m ¡ c ¡°g and
The variable b denotes assets entering period 2 after the shock.
(
Subtracting (42) from (41) we have:
Notice that subtracting equation (26) from (25), applying the PPP (24) and the hypothesis of …xed prices yields:
Substituting (44) into (43) yields:
Now, notice that combining (long-run versions of) equations (34), (35), (28), (29), (25) and (26) yields:
Substituting the last expression in to (45), gives the second relationship 25 between e and c ¡ c
This relationship is again equivalent to the one derived by OR for°= 0. Notice that, if 0 <°< 1; the introduction of our additional hypothesis implies a higher depreciation for the home currency following a domestic expansion. 25 In deriving (47), we also made use of the fact that the Euler equations imply (c¡c
3.4 Short-Run Consumption Multipliers: Direct CrowdingOut in an Open Economy
The next step to …nd a reduced form for short-run consumption c, is to solve the system of (39) and (47) for the short-run consumption di¤erential c ¡ c ¤ . This yields:
where ¡ = [
Although the latter expression might seem cumbersome, it is very useful to perform policy experiments. In particular, setting g = g = g p and g
, we obtain the e¤ect of a domestic permanent expansion on short-run consumption. In order to have some insights on how the results for our model di¤ers from the OR case of pure waste, it is interesting to perform this experiment considering …rst the case of°= 0, and subsequently to look at the di¤erential e¤ect of the hypothesis°> 0.
When government expenditure is pure waste we have:
Equation (50) indicates that a permanent domestic …scal expansion lowers consumption. This is clearly connected with the fact that, this policy being …nanced with domestic taxes, it makes home agents poorer. Therefore, they react reducing their consumption. The di¤erence with the closed economy case, in which when°= 0 the e¤ect on consumption is zero rather than negative 26 , is due to the fact that in an open economy in which neither private agents nor the government display home-bias for domestically 26 Remember equation (36).
produced goods, a domestic …scal shock stimulates the demand for both domestic and foreign goods. Part of the bene…ts of the expansionary policy, therefore, accrue to foreign agents, while all the costs (the lump-sum increase in taxation) are sustained by the domestic country. Formally, this implies that the negative e¤ect on consumption in (50) is increasing in the dimension of the foreign country.
The di¤erential e¤ect 27 of°> 0 turns out to be:
Not surprisingly, (51) reproduces (36) when n ! 1. The negative e¤ect 28 derived in (51) is consistent with the intuition of direct crowding-out: when private and public consumption are perfect substitutes the reduction in private consumption following a domestic expansion is bigger than in the case of pure waste. Notice that this result, although consistent with an intuitive argument, can not be taken for granted a priori. In an intertemporal optimizing model of this kind, infact, the e¤ect of the anticipated component of a permanent expansion on short-run consumption could in principle lead to di¤erent conclusions. Examples of the latter can be found in the closedeconomy literature. For example Rankin (1987) , in an overlapping generation model in which government spending is assumed to bene…t only the young, …nds that the e¤ect of an anticipated increase in government expenditure on current consumption becomes less negative when government expenditure a¤ects utility, compared to the pure waste case, and could also become positive depending on the parameters values. Similarly Neary and Stiglitz (1983) , …nd that in a general equilibrium model an anticipated increase in spending, bringing about an anticipated multiplier e¤ect on the consumer's future income, raises current consumption. To see whether similar e¤ects are at work in our model, it is possible to decompose the …scal policy shock in to its temporary and anticipated components 29 . Like in the closed economy models mentioned above, the e¤ect of the anticipated component in equation (51) However, the sign of the total e¤ect in equation (51) points out that, the 27 The total e¤ect is equal to the sum of (50) and (51). (negative) e¤ect of the temporary component is dominant in determining the result that consumption falls more if government spending a¤ects utility in a non-separable way. The same decomposition in the pure waste case (equation 50) shows that both the temporary and anticipated e¤ects have a negative impact on consumption.
Turning to foreign …scal policy shocks, we can set g ¤ = g ¤ = g ¤ p and g = g = g p = 0 in (49). This gives the total spillover e¤ect:
For°= 0; the last expression indicates that a foreign …scal expansion has a positive spillover e¤ect on consumption. In that case equation (52) is a mirror image of (50), and can be explained with a symmetric argument: when the foreign government expands, domestic agents experience the bene…t of such policy but not the costs, and this allows them to raise their consumption. Recalling that we assumed 0 <°< 1, (52) also shows that the introduction of utility enhancing government spending has the e¤ect of reducing the positive consumption spillover following a foreign expansion. It is important to stress that it is the fact that foreign agents gain utility from foreign government expenditure that a¤ects the home agents' reaction 31 . As foreign consumption falls also on domestic goods, the reduction in foreign consumption due to direct crowding-out negatively a¤ects the demand for home agents goods, therefore reducing home consumption. This e¤ect, however, is not so strong to reverse the basic result of an overall positive consumption spillover 32 . Decomposition of the international spillover in to its temporary and anticipated components shows that both e¤ects go in the same direction.
Output E¤ects with Microfounded Money Demand
A similar analysis can be applied to study the e¤ects on output. We start applying formula (38) to equation (44). This gives:
31
Remember that in this policy experiment domestic shocks are set to zero.
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Consumption can fall, of course, if we relax our assumption and allow°to be bigger than unity. The latter case, however, has been considered in previous literature as a purely theoretical possibility with no empirical relevance (see Heijdra and Ligthart, 1997, p.812).
To …nd an expression for the short-run exchange rate, we solve for e the system of equations (39) and (47), obtaining:
Substituting (37) and (54) in to (53) we derive the reduced form for y (see Appendix ). The total e¤ects on output of a domestic and foreign …scal expansion can be derived as before. This yields the following expressions for the multipliers:
Remembering that µ > 1 and 0 <°< 1, equations (55) and (56) tell us that a domestic …scal expansion increases home output, while a foreign expansion has the opposite e¤ect.
If we were in a ‡exible price world, the result that the agents of the country that expands decide to work more could be explained, as for consumption, with the fact that home agents have to pay taxes to …nance this policy. As leisure is a normal good, they would react increasing their labor supply, thereby increasing output. In the …xed price case, however, this argument becomes irrelevant, because the economy is not on the labor supply curve. An explanation for the results in (55) and (56) seems rather to be connected with the nominal exchange rate movements. From equation (54) it can be shown that following a domestic …scal expansion the domestic exchange rate depreciates, but the depreciation is mitigated as°increases (
where an increase in e indicates depreciation of the home currency.
price, and viceversa, the exchange rate movements can explain the e¤ect on output derived in (55), that is positive but decreasing in°. A symmetric argument can be used to explain the negative spillover on output when the foreign country expands, and the fact that an increase in°m itigates the magnitude of this e¤ect. The dynamic of the exchange rate gives some insights on why the spillover e¤ect is opposite to the standard result in the literature on macroeconomic interdependence, i.e. the one derived in the two-country version of the MF model. In MF a …scal expansion in one country raises output in the other. This happens because the country that expands faces an appreciation of its currency, and this channel of international transmission is dominant in determining the sign of the positive output spillover. On the contrary, in our model, the currency of the country that expands depreciates. In terms of equation (54), this means that an increase in g The fact that the currency of the country that expands depreciates can be explained with an argument similar to the one developed by OR in the pure waste case 35 . Taking as example a foreign expansion, we have that this policy implies a fall in relative foreign consumption. Lower consumption abroad in turn implies a lower foreign money demand, that requires a depreciation of the foreign currency. The reason for which here the negative spillover is mitigated with respect to the OR case, is that in our model a foreign …scal expansion a¤ects the foreign money demand not only through the fall in relative consumption. There is another e¤ect of …scal policy on money demand, that depends on the fact that our money demands are positive functions not only of private consumption but of the …scal stance of the countries as well 36 . When the foreign country expands, therefore, there is a positive e¤ect on the foreign money demand that partially o¤set the negative one already described by OR.
The two e¤ects can be analyzed formally going back to the two partial relationships used to derive the …nal relationship between …scal policy shocks and the exchange rate, i.e. equations (39) and (47). Inspection of those 34 Formally:
The former expression shows that an increase in g ¤ p implies an appreciation of the home currency and a depreciation of the foreign currency (the one of the country that expands). 35 See OR( 1996, p.704).
36
Remember equations (32) and (33).
shows that the e¤ect on the exchange rate that arises through (39) goes in the opposite direction with respect to the …nal e¤ect derived in (54). The positive relationship between e and g ¤ in (39) arises through the direct e¤ect of a …scal expansion on the money demand, that is absent in OR. On the contrary, the negative partial relationship between e and g ¤ derived in (47) is due to the indirect e¤ect of …scal policy on money demand, that acts through the fall in relative consumption. This last negative relationship more than o¤set the one derived in (39), and it is therefore the dominant one in determining the …nal e¤ect. The e¤ects at work following a foreign expansion are summarized in Table 1 (a symmetric Table can be used to illustrate the internal multiplier). Table 1 .
E¤ects of a Foreign Expansion
Indirect E¤ect (OR): g*"=) (c ¡ c¤) "=)Foreign Money Dem.#=) e #=) y # Direct E¤ect (°> 0) : g*"=) (c +°g¤) "=)Foreign Money Dem."=) e "=) y " 0<°< 1 ensures that the …nal output spillover is negative An important remark must be made on the speci…cation of the money demand equations. Both the e¤ects emphasized in the previous discussion depend on the fact that, in our model, the money demand equations are explicitly derived from microfoundation, and are functions of what we have de…ned "full consumption" (that can in turn be thought to be a function of disposable income). This is a di¤erence with the traditional MF model, where money demand is a function of gross income. The observation that modelling money demand as a function of disposable rather than gross income is crucial in determining the direction of …scal policy spillovers is consistent with some previous …ndings in the literature. In particular, the derivation of money demand from microfoundation is the explanation provided by Rankin (1990) for the fact that his two-country model with nominal rigidities yields results that are at odds with the MF ones 37 . Our analysis seems to con…rm the relevance of this argument. 37 The consequences of having disposable rather than gross income as argument of the money demand function were …rst analysed in a closed-economy IS/LM model by Holmes and Smith (1972) In summary, the …scal policy interdependence pattern emerging from the analysis of short-run multipliers calls for four general considerations. First, our analysis of a two-country world is consistent with the conventional wisdom for the closed economy case. As n ! 1; the basic results on the crowding-out e¤ects of …scal policy already emphasized by Bailey (1971) and Buiter (1977) are reproduced by our model. The main contribution of our analysis with respect to the closed economy case is, therefore, that of deriving those results in an explicitly microfounded framework. Second, our results for the two-country interdependence generalize those for the closed economy case with regards to the e¤ects on consumption, as the introduction of perfect substitutability between public and private consumption has a negative e¤ect on both the domestic multiplier and the international spillover. Third, our results are opposite to the MF ones with respect to the output spillover, and this seems to depend crucially on the way in which money demand equations are speci…ed in microfounded models. Fourth, turning to the welfare analysis, the short-run e¤ects of …scal policy in the case of pure waste go in the direction of lowering home welfare following a domestic expansion and raising it following a foreign expansion. This is consistent with the claim made by OR (1995, 1996 ) that a …scal expansion is a beggar-thyself but not a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. The introduction of the additional hypothesis of perfect substitutability unambiguously lowers welfare following a foreign expansion, but it has ambiguous e¤ects with respect to a domestic expansion, as it lowers consumption but raises leisure 38 . Of course, a complete welfare analysis can be done only after having derived the long-run e¤ects. This will be an interesting exercise in the pure waste case, given that OR claim their results on …scal policy verbally 39 , but do not provide detailed derivations. This task is left for Section 4. An intermediate step is that of explicitly analysing macroeconomic interdependence in the long run. This is the focus of what follows.
E¤ects of Fiscal Policy on Long Run Variables
Although prices adjust to a ‡exible steady-state in the long-run, the longrun multipliers are not the same that we would observe in a ‡exible-price 38 See the di¤erential e¤ects of°in Table 1 . economy. They are a¤ected, through the asset accumulation process, by the fact that prices are sticky in the …rst period 40 . In order to derive the long-run multipliers it is therefore necessary to …nd a reduced form that expresses shifts in the foreign assets b, in terms of …scal policy shocks only. To do this, we start substituting (39) and (44) into (43), this yields
Substituting (54) for e in (57) gives the reduced form for b (see Appendix). At this point, we can derive an expression for relative long-run consumption inverting (46). Solving the deriving expression for levels through formula (38), substituting (78) for b and taking into account that (see Appendix for the derivation):
yields a reduced form for c (see Appendix), that can be used to derive the multipliers.
For a domestic expansion when°= 0 we have:
The di¤erential e¤ect of°> 0 is:
Remembering that µ > 1, equations (59) and (60) clearly indicate that the long-run e¤ects on consumption of this policy go in the same direction as the short-run ones. Consumption falls, and falls more when°> 0: Furthermore, 40 This is not true, of course, for the world long-run multipliers derived in (A3). As the world economy is not a¤ected by the distribution of wealth between the two countries, they are the same as in the ‡exible-price case. 41 This is the point where price-stickiness a¤ects the long-run e¤ects. In a ‡exible price world, in fact, it is impossible to set p(h) and p ¤ (f) to zero in equation (43). In order to derive a semi-reduced form for b, di¤erent from (57), it is necessary to consider short-run versions of the labor-leisure trade o¤ equations, that bind in that case. For the details see Ganelli (1998). comparing (59) with (50) it is clear that-the long run e¤ect is equivalent to the short-run one plus the additional term ¡ n 2
. This means that in the long run consumption falls more than in the short run. This di¤erence might be explained recalling the way in which we have introduced nominal rigidities. Agents knows that prices, following a demand shock, increase in the second period, but not in the short-run, as they are sticky. Therefore, they reduce their consumption more in the period in which prices are expected to rise. Comparing (60) and (51), however, shows that the direct crowding-out e¤ect is smaller in the long run.
Turning to a foreign expansion, the total multiplier is given by:
Equation (61) shows that the e¤ect of a foreign …scal expansion is in general ambiguous 42 . To have an idea of the sign of the international spillover e¤ects we can give some numerical examples. Remembering that ± is the real interest rate, and setting it equal to 0:05, we can solve a second order equation in the numerator of (61) in order to …nd for which values of µ it is positive. Neglecting the negative root given by this equation, a condition for the term in the square brackets in (61) to be positive (i.e for the spillover e¤ect to be negative), is µ > 7. Previous research suggests that a sensible value for µ should be below this threshold 43 . The latter result would, therefore, seems reassuring, in the sense that the e¤ect of a foreign …scal expansion should increase home consumption in the long run as well as in the short run. However, it also indicates the possibility of a negative international spillover on consumption in a situation of low market power (as µ increases 44 ) and/or high real interest rate 45 . Overall, the above analysis shows that also in the long-run, the e¤ects of consumption multipliers are in line with what we would expect on the basis of 42 To see this, notice that the numerator can be rearranged as ¡µ±(1 ¡ µ) ¡ 2(1 + ±), i.e. as the sum of a positive and of a negative value. 43 For example, Sutherland (1996) sets µ = 6 in numerical simulations for a similar model.
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This is consistent with the intuition that in a Walrasian world of perfect competition …scal policies are unable to raise welfare. the analysis of a closed economy. The fact that public and private consumption are perfect substitutes has a crowding-out e¤ect on private consumption in the case of a domestic expansion, as consumption falls more than in the pure waste case (the di¤erential e¤ect of°> 0 in (60) is negative). The introduction of this hypothesis has also the e¤ect of reducing the increase in consumption deriving from a foreign expansion in the (empirically plausible) case in which the consumption spillover is positive. The introduction of a positive°; therefore, tends to push consumption choices in the same direction in the short and long run.
We can combine (34), (35), (25)and (26) to derive a semi-reduced form for long-run relative output as a function of b and (g ¡g ¤ ). Applying formula (38) to the resulting expression, together with the fact that (see Appendix):
gives:
substituting the reduced form for b in (63) yields the reduced form for long-run output(see Appendix).
The multipliers in this case are:
Equations (64) and (65)show that the e¤ects of both domestic and foreign …scal expansions are positive but decreasing in°.
In interpreting these results, we must bear in mind that in the long run the economy is on the labor supply curve. Furthermore, in this model a domestic (foreign) expansion implies an increase in b (b ¤ ), i.e. in the current account entering the second period 46 . What does this imply for the domestic multiplier? It is straightforward to notice that the increase in e that follows a domestic expansion raises b in equation (57), and in turns b has a negative 46 The international shift in wealth is due to the fact that a domestic expansion lowers home consumption and raises home output in the short-run, and viceversa. e¤ect on domestic output in (63). In words, the nominal depreciation, that makes output increase in the short-run, makes the country richer in the longrun. As now the economy is on the labor supply curve, this e¤ect should push agents to consume more leisure and work less. Given this, why output still increases in the long-run? First, there is also a negative e¤ect on b in (57), due to the term (°¡ 1)g, that arises through equation (41). Although not dominant in determining the sign of the e¤ect on b, the latter captures the fact that domestic agents pay taxes in the …rst period to …nance the …scal expansion. Second, the incentive that domestic agents have to increase leisure because of the increase in their wealth entering period 2 (the longrun), is more than o¤set by a long-run supply side e¤ect. This re ‡ects the fact that home agents have to …nance the expansion in the long-run as well in the short-run. Formally, the dominant e¤ect is given in (63) by the factor 1 2 (1¡°) that, being derived from the labor-leisure equations, clearly captures long-run factors. As an increase in°reduces the term 1 2 (1 ¡°), it is not surprising that the di¤erential e¤ect of°> 0 in (64) is negative.
The previous discussion also casts some light on the fact that the international spillover becomes positive in the long-run. In this case, when g ¤ p increases e and b go down, implying a negative e¤ect on domestic output in (63). The appreciation of the domestic currency following a foreign expansion implies current account losses, making the home country poorer and pushing agents to increase their labor supply. In this case, this is the …nal e¤ect, because the taxation burden falls on foreign agents. The multipliers derived so far can now be added up together to carry out a welfare analysis. This is the focus of next Section. Table 2 summarizes the positive e¤ects of di¤erent policies on short and longrun variables, distinguishing the pure waste case from the di¤erential e¤ect of°> 0:
Welfare Implications
The results in Table 2 support the OR claim that the a domestic expansion is a beggar-thyself policy, as both the short and long-run movements go in the direction of reducing home welfare. It is not straightforward, however, to evaluate whether the home country is going to bene…t from a foreign expansion, as this policy has an ambiguous e¤ect on long-run consumption and a positive e¤ect on long-run output. Therefore, the OR claim that the Home country gains when the other expands is not unambiguously true, at least in theory. However, this is the result that arises for sensible parameter values. Table 2 . Positive E¤ects of Permanent Fiscal Expansions Home°= 0 Home di¤er.°> 0 Foreign°= 0 Foreign di¤.°> 0 c --
order to see this, we can add up together the positive e¤ects in a loglinearized version of the utility function. As customary in this literature, we focus on the real component of the utility function (1), neglecting the welfare e¤ects of real balances. The log-linearized expression is therefore:
When°= 0 this is equivalent to the expression used by OR. In this case, plugging in (66) the multipliers derived in Section 3, and setting g
, some algebra shows that the short-run negative e¤ect on output (i.e. positive e¤ect on utility) following this policy dominates the long-run one, that goes in the opposite direction. The only ambiguity left to evaluate the overall consequence of a foreign expansion is, therefore, that on long-run consumption. In Section 3, however, we proved that the long-run consumption spillover is positive for sensible parameters values. We can therefore conclude, like OR, that the total welfare spillover in the pure waste case, although ambiguous prima facie, is likely to be positive. A …scal expansion is not very likely to be a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. Table 2 also shows that allowing°> 0 reduces home consumption but raises home leisure in every period, following a domestic expansion. The indirect e¤ects on utility illustrated in the second column of Table 1 must also be weighted against the fact that government spending now directly a¤ects utility. As before, substituting in (66) the multipliers of a unity domestic expansion, it is possible to prove that the introduction of a positive°unam-biguously raises the welfare e¤ects of this policy compared to the baseline case. This happens because the direct increase in utility more than o¤sets the reduction in consumption due to direct crowding-out 47 . Whether the di¤erential e¤ect of°> 0 is strong enough to reverse the OR beggar-thyself result depends on the speci…c parameters value.
5 Home Bias in Government Spending: the Missing Piece in the Quasi Neutrality Puzzle?
In Section 3 and 4 we mainly focused on permanent …scal policy expansions. An interesting issue arises if we consider temporary expansions. In models that are similar in spirit to the one we are presenting, temporary expansions tends to be quasi-neutral, in the sense that they imply a unity multiplier on the output of the country that expands, without any e¤ect on the other variables 48 . Although in all the models in which this property holds government spending falls only on domestically produced goods, the link between this hypothesis and quasi-neutrality has not been fully investigated yet. In this Section we argue that home bias in government spending is the main explanation for quasi-neutrality.
From the reduced forms of our model, it is possible to show that quasineutrality does not hold, not even in the OR case of pure waste. However, if we modify the OR framework allowing for home bias in government spending, quasi-neutrality immediately arises. In what follows we prove this formally, restricting our analysis to the case of no direct crowding-out (°= 0). With home bias, the domestic government consumption index is rede…ned as:
The index for the foreign country is, similarly, an integral between n and 1. In this framework, the (per-capita) demand for the domestic representative agent's good comes only from domestic government and it is given by:
Of course, in addition to this, we also have a positive e¤ect on leisure. where government expenditure is now de ‡ated by a price index that is di¤erent form the private consumption one 49 , given by:
Aggregating demand from home government with demand from domestic and foreign private agents gives the new world demand for the domestic agent's output as:
Log-linearization of (68), taking in to account that in the initial symmetric steady-state P 0 = P G0 = p 0 (z), yields:
Proceeding in a symmetric way for the foreign country we …nd a corresponding expression, that enables us to express relative output as:
As the only change in the model concerns the demand equations, the expressions used in Section 3 are still valid as long as the demand equations were not used to derive them 50 . This is the case for equation (43). Substituting (69) into (43) yields an expression for the current account as a function of the exchange rate and of the consumption di¤erential, in which the e¤ects of the temporary components of …scal policy cancel out:
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The indexes of aggregate private consumption, and therefore their de ‡ators, are unchanged. 50 The existence of two di¤erent price indexes for private and public consumption implies that the government budget constraint should be rewritten as:
but this is irrelevant when we log-linearize around a symmetric steady-state where
The last expression corresponds to equation (45) in Section 3, with the di¤erence that the term (g ¡ g ¤ ) does not appear in it. The fact that differential …scal expansions now a¤ect di¤erential demand (because there is home bias), implies the disappearance of di¤erential e¤ects of …scal expansions, that were present in Section 3. Intuitively, the gains that home agents derive, in terms of increased demand for their goods, from domestic expansions, perfectly o¤set the costs deriving from the taxes that they have to pay to …nance this policy. Equation (70) is a …rst step in proo…ng that quasi-neutrality holds under the new assumptions: it shows that the current account is not directly a¤ected by temporary …scal policy expansions. The fact that g and g ¤ do not appear in (70) also means that it is not necessary to carry out explicitly the rest of the calculations in order to prove our claim. The other relationship derived in Section 3 (equation 39), infact, still holds, and with pure waste government expenditure it can be rewritten as:
It is clear from Section 3 that the remaining changes to the algebra are concerned only with the e¤ects of anticipated …scal policy. As in this Section we are only interested to the temporary ones, we can repeat the analysis of Section 3 writing the variables as implicit functions of the anticipated components. This leads to the following expressions for the nominal exchange rate and the consumption di¤erential
Equation (72) proves that the nominal exchange rate is a function only of the anticipated components, and is therefore not a¤ected by permanent policies. Solving (73) for levels gives:
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Notice that we have replaced (c ¡ c ¤ ) with (c ¡ c ¤ ) exploiting a well known property of the model when°= 0. The result that the exchange rate and relative consumption are not functions of temporary shocks stems from the fact that (g ¡ g ¤ ) does not a¤ect b.
Clearly, the result that when°= 0 in (36) world consumption is zero still holds 52 . Therefore (74) proofs that temporary expansions do not a¤ect consumption. What about output? Solving for levels equation (69), and substituting (72) for the nominal exchange rate gives:
Again neglecting the e¤ects of the anticipated component and using the fact that, with°= 0; y w = g w = ng + (1 ¡ n)g ¤ gives:
From (76) we can derive the following expressions for domestic and foreign temporary …scal expansions: y = g and y = 0g ¤ = 0 This completes our proof. After the introduction of home bias in government spending, the model displays the quasi neutrality property: a temporary …scal expansion in one country implies a unity multiplier on that country's output, while all the other macroeconomic variables (output in the other country, consumption in both countries, the current account and the nominal exchange rate) are not a¤ected.
This section is illuminating in showing how crucially the …scal policy interdependence pattern depicted in Section 3 depends on the assumption of no home-bias. With home bias, the costs of having to pay taxes to …nance the domestic expansion are perfectly o¤set by the positive stimulation of domestic demand. Unlike in Section 3, the bene…ts of such policy are now not shared with the foreign country. The internal multiplier for consumption is therefore zero rather than negative. This breaks down what we previously called the indirect e¤ect of …scal expansions on money demand. As in the pure waste there is no direct e¤ect, the exchange rate neither depreciates nor appreciates, and the output spillover is therefore zero.
Conclusions
This paper …lls in a gap in the literature, o¤ering a systematic study of direct crowding-out in the OR framework. In this intertemporal optimizing framework …scal policy is e¤ective in in ‡uencing macroeconomic variables, 52 The new hypothesis introduced in this Section would change only the e¤ects of the anticipated components in the derivations of Appendix (3). and therefore welfare. Unlike in Keynesian ad hoc models, however, the …nal impact on agents' welfare can not be measured simply by output movements, but all the positive e¤ects need to be added up into a welfare metric. Microfoundation also implies that the positive and normative results crucially depend on the preferences speci…cation. We …nd that non-separability tends to have negative e¤ects on consumption and output following both domestic and foreign expansions. The more relevant exception is the positive e¤ect that non-separability has on the (negative) foreign expansion multiplier on output in the short-run. Both the positive e¤ect of non-separability and the fact that the total spillover e¤ect is opposite to the one obtained in the MF model can be explained with the derivation of money demand equations from microfoundation.
Section 5 shows how sensitive the results of the baseline model are to modi…cations of the assumption that both private agents and the government do not distinguish between domestic and foreign produced goods. The latter result has some important policy implications. It points out that national policy makers and international agencies should take in to account, when assessing the international e¤ects of …scal policies, not only the level of public expenditure but also its composition. The latter aspect tends to be neglected in international treaties that emphasize numerical targets for macroeconomic variables.
In our analysis we focused on the simple case of complete home bias. A more thorough investigation of intermediate degrees of home bias, both in private and public consumption, could be a fruitful paths for future research. The fact that the predictions of this class of models are strongly a¤ected by changes in the microeconomic foundations should not be cause of discouragement. It should rather be a stimulus to undertake the work needed to build a new paradigm for the analysis of macroeconomic interdependence, that is still under construction. APPENDIX A1). Reduced forms: This can be proofed solving a system for the short-run world consumption and real interest rate. A …rst relationship between these two variables is derived multiplying (30) by n and (31) by (1 ¡ n) and adding the results:
A second relationship between c w and r can be derived using the loglinearized money demand equations (32) and (33): Figure 1 : Indi¤erence Curves between Private and Public Consumption in Period Utility (Following the same expansion in government expenditure, showed on the horizontal axis, the reduction in private consumption that keeps the individual on the same indi¤erence curve is smaller if gamma is less than unity)
